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Napoleon Bonaparte’s Concordat and the French Revolution
Abstract
In 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte and Pope Pius XVII signed an agreement called the Concordat, which was an
agreement between the French state and the Catholic Church that reconciled the Church with the anti-
religious policies established during the French Revolution. This paper discusses the conflicting viewpoints
held by various historians concerning the legacy of the Concordat; that is, did the agreement fulfill the
religious goals of the early revolutionaries or did it betray their ideals? Ultimately, the paper concludes that the
Concordat did indeed uphold the religious principles established during the early stages of the Revolution.
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Napoleon Bonaparte’s Concordat and the French Revolution 
Kristy Hosack 
 
 On July 15, 1801, Napoleon Bonaparte and Pope Pius VII signed an 
agreement called the Concordat; this document influenced the relationship 
between church and state in France for the next century. The Concordat 
attempted to reconcile the religious conflicts that had plagued France since the 
beginning of the French Revolution in 1789. During the Liberal Phase of the 
Revolution from 1789 to 1792, the revolutionary governments took measures 
to reform the Roman Catholic Church and the relationship between church and 
state. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy of 1790 carried out many of these 
reforms by establishing the Constitutional Church. The principal 
accomplishments of the Liberal Phase of the Revolution included bringing the 
Church under state control, establishing religious tolerance, abolishing the 
privileges of the Church under the Ancien Régime, selling the Church’s land to 
raise money for the state, and subjecting the selection of bishops to popular 
elections. Bonaparte’s Concordat and the accompanying Organic Articles 
maintained the accomplishments of the Revolution’s Liberal Phase through 
their provisions and stipulations. The Revolution became much more radical 
from 1793 to 1794, and the government in power completely abolished 
Catholicism; the government that followed this period, the Directory, legally 
separated church and state. While the later stages of the Revolution are 
important, the early phase of the Revolution is the main focus of this paper, as 
there are much stronger corollaries between its religious policies and those 
established by the Concordat. As a number of historians argue, the Concordat 
preserved the achievements of the Liberal Revolution because it maintained 
many of its most important accomplishments. Other historians, however, argue 
that the Concordat destroyed the gains of the early Revolution and even 
strengthened the Church at the expense of the state, but their principal 
arguments are unsubstantiated. Thus, while the Concordat did not preserve 
every single religious accomplishment of the Revolution, overall, it protected 
and maintained the religious decisions and achievements of the early 
revolutionaries. 
Bonaparte recognized that it was important to end the religious 
conflicts in France and to establish peace within the country; after all, the 
relationship between the Church and the French state was almost nonexistent 
when he came to power. Bonaparte was not a religious man, but he was aware 
of the social role that religion played in society.  He recognized that religion 
was an important way to achieve social stability. In this way, he and the leader 
of the government during the subsequent Radical Phase of the Revolution, 
Maximilian Robespierre, shared similar viewpoints, for Robespierre also 
understood the important social role that religion played. Robespierre himself 
was a deist, but he insisted on establishing a state religion, the Cult of the 
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Supreme Being, which would act as a social pacifier. However, whereas prior 
revolutionary leaders and governments were not successful in establishing a 
long-term, acceptable relationship between the Catholic Church and the French 
nation, Bonaparte achieved success because of his willingness to cooperate. 
Bonaparte was able to strike a balance between the two major camps of 
religious thought:  radical anti-clericalism versus extreme loyalty to the Catholic 
Church. This ability to compromise allowed him to establish an agreement that 
remained in effect for more than a century. 
   Bonaparte and Pope Pius XVII finalized the Concordat in 1815 
after nearly a year of negotiations. The agreement recognized Catholicism as 
“the religion of the great majority of citizens,” and the clergy (the bishops and 
the parish priests) became employees of the  
state.
1
 In addition, the Concordat permitted the establishment of seminaries, 
although the state would not fund them. The agreement also required all clergy 
to take an oath of loyalty to the government and to say prayers for the state at 
the end of each mass. Furthermore, the state received the power to appoint 
bishops, who subsequently were allowed to appoint the parish priests. The 
Concordat also included papal recognition and acceptance of the Church lands 
that had been confiscated by the state and sold during the Revolution. After 
Bonaparte’s government initially opposed the Concordat, he added a series of 
stipulations called the Organic Articles, which subjected the clergy to more 
restrictions and government supervision.  
Historians are divided as to whether the Concordat and the Organic 
Articles upheld the laws and regulations established during the Revolution’s 
Liberal Phase. For example, many historians argue that the Concordat actually 
increased papal authority and influence in France, which the revolutionaries 
had tried to prevent. Historian Louis Madelin argues that the very fact that 
Bonaparte, as the head of a republic, consulted the Pope and included him in 
negotiations serves as proof of increased papal influence.
2
 After all, the 
National Assembly did not consult the Pope when they crafted the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy.  
The reorganization of the episcopate is another area where some 
historians argue that papal influence was increased. Madelin argues that the 
Pope received an “astounding increase of authority” when Bonaparte gave him 
the right to dismiss the bishops that had been consecrated prior to the 
Revolution.
3
 Historian Robert B. Holtman also argues that this provision gave 
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the Pope “more power over the clergy in France than he had ever held 
during the ancient régime, and more power over bishops.”
4
 To these historians, 
this power was significant because it set a precedent for further papal 
interference: if he could dismiss those bishops, then he might be able to 
dismiss others in the future and thus have a significant amount of influence 
over the Catholic Church in France. Historians such as David Laven and Lucy 
Riall also point to the fact that while Bonaparte appointed the new bishops, the 
Pope had the right to invest them with their spiritual authority, which gave the 
Pope a power he had not enjoyed before the French Revolution.
5
 In addition, 
Holtman notes that because the Concordat did not mention monastic orders, it 
effectively gave permission for new religious orders to be established that 
would owe “their allegiance to the Pope directly,” instead of to the French 
government; this further increased the Pope’s authority.
6
 Thus, historian Frank 
McLynn concludes that the “attempt by the Revolution to exclude the French 
Church from papal influence had manifestly failed.”
7
 Instead, McLynn argues, 
the Concordat established a precedent for further influence and interventions.
8
   
McLynn also argues that the Concordat abandoned Revolutionary 
principles and accomplishments when it gave the state the authority to choose 
bishops, who would then choose the parish priests.
9
 After all, this was 
fundamentally different from the Constitutional Church under the Revolution, 
which had given the people the right to democratically elect their clergy. 
Historians such as Georges Lefebvre also assert that Bonaparte and the new 
bishops allowed counter-revolutionary clergy to dominate Church offices, given 
that the Concordat “did not specify any specially reserved places for the 
constitutional bishops.”
10
 Such historians argue that this conflicted with the 
fact that only Constitutional bishops had held Church posts during the 
Revolution, for the government had dismissed all counter-revolutionary 
bishops who had refused to swear an oath of obedience. Likewise, Madelin 
argues that by dismissing the bishops of the Constitutional Church and 
primarily replacing them with counter-revolutionary clergy, the Concordat 
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effectively abolished the Constitutional Church. Therefore, Madelin 
concludes that the Concordat did not preserve an important accomplishment 
of the Revolution.
11
   
On the other hand, there are also many historians who maintain that 
the Concordat preserved the gains of the Revolution. For example, historian 
Martyn Lyons argues that the Concordat conserved the principles of religious 
tolerance established by the early revolutionaries. He asserts that because the 
Concordat did not claim that Catholicism was the established religion of France, 
it firmly established the principle of religious tolerance by depriving the 
Catholic Church of its monopoly on religion.
12
 In addition, by extending 
tolerance to Protestants, the Concordat “preserved the principle of religious 
toleration which the Revolution had established.”
13
 Historian Nigel Aston adds 
that the Concordat gave the Calvinists and Lutherans much more legal 
recognition, thereby preserving the policy of tolerance as a “lasting fruit of the 
Revolution.”
14
  
Furthermore, Lyons emphasizes that in making the clergy salaried 
employees of the state, the Concordat fulfilled what “the Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy of 1790 had intended,” which was to bring the clergy under state 
control and reduce papal authority.
15
 Lyons asserts that because all bishops 
and approximately 35,000 parish priests would receive their salaries from the 
state, the government would have significant control over their actions. 
Historian David Jan Sorkin also points out that because the Concordat gave the 
state the right to appoint the bishops instead of the Pope, it “subjected the 
Church to even greater state supervision.”
16
 In addition, historians assert that 
the Organic Articles contributed to the reduction in papal authority, for the 
Articles limited the actions of the bishops and tightened the state’s control 
over the Church.  Lyons argues that these Articles “amounted to a 
strengthening of centralised authority at the expense of the helpless Papacy.”
17
 
In addition, Sorkin maintains that the Articles preserved the independence of 
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the state from Church authority.
18
 Thus, according to these historians, the 
Concordat and its Articles significantly weakened the Pope’s authority. 
Furthermore, Lyons maintains that the Church did not regain its 
privileged status with the Concordat, which is what the early revolutionaries 
had wanted. First, the newly-drawn diocesan boundaries eliminated 
inequalities that had existed under the Ancien Régime and instead adhered to 
reason and rationality. As Lyons declares, under the Ancien Régime, “a few very 
rich bishoprics contrasted with a multitude of small and poorer ones,” but 
because of the Concordat, these “inequalities had definitely disappeared.”
19
 In 
addition, because the Church received no tax exemptions or special privileges, 
Lyons asserts that it no longer held a special position within the state and 
instead was subject to government control, “just as the National Assembly had 
intended.”
20
 Also, historians such as Susan P. Conner emphasize that the 
Concordat legalized the land transfers conducted during the Revolution, 
thereby adhering to “the principles of the Revolution” by eliminating a principle 
source of the Church’s wealth.
21
  
Thus, it is clear that significant controversy exists concerning the 
legacy of the Concordat. Although both camps of historians make compelling 
arguments, the Concordat did in fact preserve the accomplishments of the 
early revolutionaries.  
 The French Revolution acknowledged the right of the French people to 
participate in any religion that they wanted. At the beginning of the Revolution 
in 1789, the Declaration of Rights of Man established the principle of religious 
tolerance. The Declaration states that no one “may be disturbed for his 
opinions, even in religion,” and the Constitution of 1781 included this 
guarantee.
22
 As historians Stewart Jay Brown and Timothy Tackett point out, by 
the end of 1789, Protestants had been granted complete political and civil 
rights.
23
 For the most part, the Concordat upheld this legacy of tolerance. In 
fact, as historian Alexander Grab points out, Pope Pius XVII wanted the 
Concordat to declare that Catholicism was the official religion of France, but 
Bonaparte refused to do so, “thereby preserving religious pluralism in 
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France.”
24
 In addition, the Organic Articles attached to the Concordat also 
protected the rights of these two groups of Protestants; for example, the 
Articles forbade the Catholic clergy from insulting other religions.
25
 This serves 
as further proof that the Concordat maintained the establishment of religious 
tolerance. While Bonaparte did not grant Jewish people religious tolerance 
with the Concordat, the early revolutionaries had not done so either. But, the 
Concordat did succeed in putting Lutheranism, the main religion that competed 
with Catholicism, on equal legal footing with the Catholic Church, and it did not 
grant the Pope a monopoly on religion in France. Thus, the Concordat fully 
implemented the Revolutionary principle of religious tolerance.  
 Another important gain of the French Revolution was the abolition of 
Church privilege and decadence. Under the Ancien Régime, the Church owned 
a large amount of land, was exempt from taxes, and collected tithes from all 
French citizens. However, the actions of the revolutionaries, such as abolishing 
the tithe on August 11, 1789 and selling some of the Church’s land, signaled 
that the historical inequalities were no longer acceptable. The Concordat 
maintained the Revolution’s abolition of privilege in several ways. First, it 
declared that while Catholics could make endowments to the Church if they 
desired to do so, tithing was not mandatory. While the stipulation was a 
compromise between the Ancien Régime and the Revolutionary government, it 
ultimately favored the Revolution because the French citizens now had the 
right to choose if they wished to tithe or not.  
 The Concordat also upheld another important Revolutionary gain 
concerning privilege: the sale of Church lands. On November 2, 1789, the 
National Assembly confiscated all income-producing Church lands and later 
sold the lands in order to raise money for the French state. While this was 
primarily done for financial reasons, it also reflected a desire to prevent the 
Church from maintaining inequitable economic privileges. Under the National 
Assembly, the Church no longer owned a significant portion of the land in 
France nor was it able to generate income from its land. The Concordat 
maintained this Revolutionary gain by declaring that neither the Pope nor his 
successors would “disturb in any manner those who have acquired alienated 
ecclesiastical possessions.”
26
 Although Bonaparte promised to compensate the 
Church for its losses, he made it clear that the compensation would be nothing 
more than a small amount. Therefore it is true, as Lyons argues, that the 
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Church was now an institution that “enjoyed no special privileges.”
27
 Thus, 
because the Concordat legalized and secured the sale of the Church lands, it 
protected one of the most important gains of the Revolution concerning 
Church privilege. 
 In addition, the Concordat followed the revolutionaries’ model of 
rational reconstruction of diocesan boundaries, which subsequently restricted 
inequalities of privilege within the Church itself. The National Assembly had 
redrawn the diocesan boundaries and had reduced the number of dioceses to 
83, in accordance with the 83 newly created departments. The Concordat also 
adhered to the principle of rationality established by the Revolution and 
reorganized the diocesan boundaries even further, creating only 50 total 
dioceses. As Lyons asserts, because of this rational reorganization, the small 
number of wealthy bishoprics that had existed in the Ancien Régime were 
effectively eliminated.
28
 Because of this reorganization, it was no longer 
possible for certain clergymen to enrich themselves simply because of the 
location or size of their bishopric. Thus, the privileges of certain clergymen 
were fully eliminated, thereby removing another source of inequality within 
the Church, as the liberal revolutionaries had intended. 
The Concordat also upheld the Revolutionary ideal of limiting papal 
authority. The revolutionaries in France had given the state greater control 
over the Church and reduced the authority of Rome, for, as Lyons asserts, one 
of the essential components of the Revolution’s religious policies was “full 
government control over the French clergy” and the Church as a whole.
29
 
During the Revolution, this was accomplished primarily through the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy. As historians Sidney Z. Ehler and John B. Morrall 
argue, “The clear aim of the Constitution was to cut off the French Church, for 
all practical purposes, from contact with Rome.”
30
 The Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy provided for the citizens to elect their bishops and parish priests, and it 
also made the clergy employees of the government, which would pay their 
salaries. The Constitution greatly reduced the Pope’s authority, for he no longer 
had any say in the selection of the clergy. The state would maintain complete 
control of the Church, for, as Lefebvre argues, “[f]ar from planning to separate 
Church and state, [the revolutionaries] dreamed of bringing the two more 
closely together.”
31
 The Concordat accomplished this goal in several ways; for 
example, the Concordat gave the state the authority to name the bishops 
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instead of the Pope, whose only role in the matter would be to sanctify the 
nominees. The Concordat also mandated that the state pay the salaries of the 
clergy, which effectively made all clergymen state employees, and therefore 
subject to state authority. Because clergymen were to receive their pay and in 
many cases, their appointments, from the state, they had no choice but to be 
obedient and loyal to Bonaparte and his government instead of to the Pope. 
 Equally important in reducing papal authority were the Organic 
Articles that Bonaparte added to the Concordat, which undeniably 
strengthened “secular authority over the clergy,” as Lyons asserts.
32
 Among 
other provisions, the Articles mandated that no papal bull be published without 
the government’s permission, that any representatives of the Pope visiting 
France had to get the consent of the French government before they could 
perform their duties, and that no French bishops could leave their dioceses 
without permission from the government. The Articles even required state 
approval in order to establish the dates of religious holidays. Aston argues that 
Bonaparte “had no intention of allowing the Pope to assume a greater status in 
the post-Concordat order than he had possessed before 1790,” and that the 
Organic Articles made it clear that “the state would have the final word, … 
leaving the clergy dependent on the government.”
33
 Indeed, the Articles placed 
authority over the Church firmly in the hands of the state, for the Church could 
hardly do a thing without clear approval from the government. This meant that 
the state, represented by Bonaparte, would be able to always know what the 
Church was doing and would have a legal way to interfere if he did not like the 
Church’s actions or decisions.   
 However, other historians disagree, and instead argue that the 
Concordat actually strengthened papal authority and influence in France. They 
argue that because the Pope had the right to dismiss the current bishops and 
because he was also trusted with investing the bishops appointed by Bonaparte 
with their spiritual authority, the power of the Papacy was increased. They also 
cite the monastic orders and assert that these fell under the sole jurisdiction of 
the Pope, given that the Concordat does not mention them at all. However, 
with the exception of the monastic orders, these are arguments that support 
the claim that the power of the Papacy increased symbolically. After all, the 
Pope received no practical gains from dismissing the bishops, nor did he 
acquire any real power from endowing the clergy with their spiritual authority. 
Lyons also points out that the French bishops were not willing to grant the 
Pope more authority, for they were increasingly “jealous of papal 
encroachments on their powers” and even argued that they received their 
authority “directly from God,” not the Pope.
34
 Thus, even had the Concordat 
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not reduced papal authority, it is arguable that the bishops would have done 
so themselves, for they were determined to guard their own power and not let 
the Pope exert too much influence over them and their dioceses. Also, even 
though historians like McLynn argue that the Pope now had a precedent for 
dismissing bishops or otherwise interfering in the future, I would argue that 
this is not true. Unique circumstances compelled Bonaparte to allow the Pope 
to exercise this power. The pope only had the right to dismiss that particular 
group of bishops, for Bonaparte did not allow further papal intervention in the 
future. In addition, the fact that the Pope had influence over the monastic 
orders is not significant. After all, the monastic orders played no important role 
in society, for Bonaparte had removed their influence in education with the 
creation of his own schools, the lycées. Thus, despite these arguments, it is still 
clear that the Concordat reduced papal influence.  
 In addition, historians such as Madelin, Holtman, and McLynn believe 
that the Concordat’s method of appointing new bishops did not coincide with 
the revolutionaries’ treatment of the bishops. They argue that the dismissal of 
the current Constitutional bishops and the installation of bishops with a wide 
range of political beliefs contradicted the Revolution’s practice of only 
accepting clergy who were in favor of the Revolution. However, I would argue 
that the policies established by the Concordat did not completely break away 
from this practice. In fact, according to historian Frank J. Coppa, Bonaparte 
nominated sixteen bishops from the Ancien Régime, twelve from the 
Constitutional Church, and thirty-two unaffiliated priests. As Coppa argues, this 
shows that Bonaparte “selected his new hierarchy in accordance with his 
principals of amalgamation to avoid the appearance of favoring any party.”
35
 
That is, Bonaparte did not favor one group of priests over another. Coppa also 
asserts that Bonaparte compelled the new bishops to reserve a number of 
positions, such as canons, vicar-generals, pastors, and curates, for 
constitutional clergy.
36
 Therefore, while the Concordat allowed non-
Constitutional priests to serve and thus did not fully preserve an important 
Revolutionary tradition, Bonaparte made up for it by not favoring one clerical 
position over the other in his choice of clergy.  
Another gain of the Revolution that the Concordat arguably did not 
preserve was the popular election of priests and bishops. The revolutionaries of 
the Liberal Phase allowed French citizens to choose their own bishops and 
parish priests through a series of elections, thus maintaining, as Malcolm Crook 
asserts, the early revolutionaries’ “passionate advocacy of popular 
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participation.”
37
 In contrast to this democratic procedure, the Concordat 
gave the state the right to choose the bishops, who would then select the 
priests. As historians such as Frank McLynn and Georges Lefebvre argue, the 
Concordat thus destroyed a fundamentally democratic aspect of the 
Revolution, for it gave the state the right to make decisions instead of the 
French citizens. However, as Crook points out in his recent study, the election 
of priests during the early Revolution actually took place in two stages. Nearly 
everyone got to vote in the first phase, but in order to qualify for the second 
stage, voters had to meet certain fiscal requirements, such as having paid taxes 
that were the equivalent of ten days’ wages.
38
 Thus, as Crook argues, “the 
electoral colleges were composed of members of the wealthy elites,” instead of 
average citizens.
39
 Therefore, instead of being a democratic process, the voting 
procedures were actually highly selective and exclusionary, at the expense of 
the common people that McLynn and other historians think were enfranchised 
during the early Revolution. In that regard, the Concordat did not infringe upon 
the revolutionary democratic tradition. In addition, I would argue that 
democracy and popular participation were not the principal goals of the early 
revolutionaries, and that empowering the state at the expense of the Church 
was more important to them. In this regard, giving the state, although 
represented by Napoleon, the right to choose the bishops achieved this goal, 
even though democracy might have suffered.  
 Thus, the Concordat was neither purely revolutionary nor completely 
influenced by the Ancien Régime. Ultimately, however, the Concordat 
preserved most of the accomplishments achieved by the revolutionaries of the 
Liberal Phase of the French Revolution. Even though some historians argue that 
the Concordat did not uphold the Revolution and argue, for example, that it 
increased papal authority or abolished revolutionary gains, their arguments are 
not valid. On the other hand, other historians assert that the Concordat’s 
provisions did, in fact, maintain the accomplishments and the spirit of the early 
revolutionaries, and it is these historians who have stronger arguments. After 
all, both the Concordat and the Liberal Phase of the Revolution increased state 
authority at the expense of the Church, supported the principle of religious 
tolerance, and diminished the privileges and inequitable wealth of the Church. 
Thus, the Concordat effectively preserved the gains of the Liberal Phase of the 
Revolution and upheld its principals and ideals.  
 
 
                                                 
 
37
 Malcolm Crook, “Citizen Bishops: Episcopal Elections in the French 
Revolution,” The Historical Journal, 43, no. 4 (December 2000) 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020875?cookieSet=1, 957. 
38
 Ibid., 958. 
 
39
 Ibid. 
 40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
